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SECURING AUTHORITY: 
The View from the Top 
By RAYMOND F. HOPKINS* 
Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of 
Change. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, 316 pp. $8.50. 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority. Chicago, 
Markham Publishing Co., 1970, 174 pp. $6.95. 
W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative. New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1969, 275 pp. $10.00. 
ALTHOUGH the literature on political development has been re-
.Il.markably insightful, hopes for a science of "nation-building" have 
not been realized. While numerous works have described the effects of 
traditional patterns, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and rapid mobiliza-
tion, and have investigated factors such as culture, bureaucracy, ideol-
ogy, and parties, we have learned very little about how to alter favorably 
the political conditions these have fostered.1 Political scientists, more 
often than not, have documented obstacles to, and failures in, political 
change desired by leaders in new states, rather than explored strategies 
whereby such change might be realized. 
The three books under review here move toward filling this gap. 
In a manner reminiscent of Machiavelli, they focus upon strategies of 
leadership for maintaining or building authority.2 Political scientists, 
argue Ilchman and Uphoff, have developed macro-theories useful for 
explanations and descriptions, but not suited for policy evaluation. They 
propose an approach that treats government policies as independent 
variables which can be assessed as to the productivity of their conse-
* I am grateful to Ruth Collier, Harry Harding, Donald Rothchild, and Kenneth 
Prewitt who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article, and to the Inter-
national Development Research Center at Indiana University who supported my re-
search and study in 1971. 
1 See, for instance, Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development 
(Princeton 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cam-
bridge 1966, rev. ed.); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Po-
litical Development (Princeton 1965); David Apter, The Politics of Modernization 
(Chicago 1965); and Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington 1967), as 
well as numerous country studies. 
2 Both Ilchman/Uphoff and Wriggins note the similarity of their analytical posture 
to that of Machiavelli. 
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272 WORLD POLITICS 
quences. In a similar but more homely fashion, Wriggins' approach is 
to explore the policy perspective of the president or prime minister, as 
he puts it, by looking "out his window to see his problems as he sees 
them" (p. 5); Leites and Wolf focus more narrowly on the contest for 
supremacy between an established authority and a rebellious group. All 
three raise the question of how authority is built. As Wriggins states 
the case, this is the fundamental task, the imperative for a ruler. Each 
examines constraints and pressures under which established leaders may 
find themselves, and then analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of 
alternative strategies of resource allocation. 
I. A MoDEL oF EXECUTIVE STRATEGY 
Although Ilchman's and Uphoff's The Political Economy of Change 
is the most ambitious and comprehensive of the works, all three have a 
number of the characteristics of a general model of executive strategy 
in common. I shall elaborate this composite model briefly, discuss 
some problems it raises for analysis, and then explore the role of legiti-
macy and support for establishing authority. 
Ilchman and Uphoff present a conceptual framework for political 
analysis based on an extended analogy from economics. In presenting 
their model, the authors use terms drawn from macroeconomic theory, 
such as investment, productivity, interest, sector, and inflation. "Po-
litical economy" involves exchanges between a regime and its sectors 
that determine the increase or decrease in political resources available 
to a regime and its populace over time. Following the analogy from 
economics, then, a regime may accumulate resources by saving or in-
vesting them, and may secure needed resources, such as taxes, from busi-
ness, labor, and other "sectors," in exchange for regime resources such 
as authority, status, or the abstention from coercion. The focus on the 
economics of authority and upon "choice" leads to considerations of the 
costs and benefits of a particular strategy. The authors claim that poli-
cies derived from their analytical framework will prove more useful 
than those derived from studies cast within the framework of political 
culture or socialization, since the latter frequently are unable to forecast 
the costs and benefits in the various decisions facing "statesmen." 
Wriggins' The Ruler's Imperative, in contrast to the Ilchman/Uphoff 
volume, is written in a readable and jargon-free style useful for intro-
ductory courses. Wriggins lists eight strategies for "aggregating power" 
commonly used by a ruler "to rally support for himself so that he can 
stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability . . . [to] get 
things done" (p. 5). These range from the appeal of personality to the 
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strengthening of a party. Such strategies used by leaders in "emerging 
Africa and Asia" are delimited partly by the weak authority and frag-
mented social systems of these societies. Wriggins' discussion of this 
political context and the goals of the leadership in new states is a suc-
cinct summary of conventional wisdom. He describes a variety of "social 
or organizational groups" including the bureaucracy, land owners, and 
trade unions, whose support or opposition may be critical for the success 
of a leader, but he ignores class conflicts and the inter-generational trans-
fer of wealth that may act as constraints on political action. 
His eight strategies are described in terms of their costs and benefits, 
but only in the most general fashion. Relationships of one strategy to 
another are glossed over, and the strategies lack the qualities of a typol-
ogy such as mutual exclusiveness or exhaustiveness. As a result, in his 
concluding chapter on strategic mixes, Wriggins can do little more 
than list some of the assets and liabilities of each strategy. His proposi-
tions about their employment have the unfalsifiable quality of an astrol-
oger's advice. For instance, he states that a leader will project his per-
sonality because doing so is easy, ambiguous ( and therefore capable of 
wide appeal), and expected (for African and Asian states are charisma-
hungry). On the other hand, Wriggins states that a wise leader will not 
over-use this strategy; it can be risky, since the emotions it evokes are 
volatile and the diminution of its returns set in fairly rapidly. 
The study of rebellion and authority by Leites and Wolf focuses upon 
the strategies used to maintain or challenge authority. In pursuing 
their goal to move "the discussion of insurgent conflict toward the level 
that has been attained in the better discussions of nuclear conflict" (p. 
v) they attempt to increase their rigor and precision by using the vo-
cabulary of economic analysis. They advocate a "systems" approach 
that examines the supply and demand of inputs needed by authorities 
and rebellions, in preference to the conventional "hearts and minds" 
theory of insurgency which holds that insurgents have their principal 
basis of support in the affections of the populace. 
Leites and Wolf illustrate rather than test their propositions by using 
examples drawn largely from third-world conflicts such as those in 
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Their main 
point is that rebellions are not dependent upon popular support, but 
rather upon securing the resources, both internally and from abroad, 
that are needed to maintain and expand their operations. A small lead-
ership cadre with adequate resources can, even if it is unpopular and 
few share its ideology, expand its extractive capability and secure com-
pliance. Caught in a struggle for control of the authority structure, the 
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populace may be more motivated by profit-maximization or by damage-
limiting goals than by abstract loyalty. 
The model of executive authority that can be extracted from these 
books contains categories of variables that are roughly equivalent: rul-
ers ( or the executive), ruled, resources, and goals. Table I summarizes 
these. Executives pursue goals, the primary one being the maintenance 
of authority, by investing and spending resources in various combina-
tions of strategies including the buying or coercing of support. Leites 
and Wolf do not disaggregate variables to the extent the others do be-
cause their focus is narrower. Ilchman and Uphoff distinguish another 
category of variables, "political infrastructure," which includes parties, 
elections bureaucracy, and information systems. Since the others discuss 
these phenomena as strategies, this distinction may be unnecessary.8 
Within this general framework a variety of partial analyses can be 
undertaken, including the struggle between an authority and a rebel-
lious group, such as that discussed throughout by Leites and Wolf ( and 
by Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 44-45). In competing for power, exchanges 
between a sector ( or a coalition of sectors) and those in authority often 
attempt to destroy each other's resources rather than to increase them. 
However, the same general cost/benefit frame of analysis can be used 
for investigating these non-productive cases. 
What benefits can we expect to derive from the analytical posture of 
the approaches outlined in the three books, and what costs might be 
entailed? Some benefits seem clear-notably the role that their com-
mon emphasis upon executive leadership can play in making more 
productive and satisfying political choices. By evaluating the conse-
quences of various strategies and tactics with respect to values, resources, 
and relevant groups, more efficient ways to achieve goals might be 
charted and insights might be obtained into the problem of establishing 
authority, as viewed from the top.4 
In using this approach, however, one encounters certain limitations, 
difficult choices, and ambiguities that need to be considered in weighing 
its merits. I shall not comment on all of these, but rather shall focus on 
six of them: ( 1) the conservative nature of the ruler's viewpoint, ( 2) 
8 Moreover, infrastructure for them is only an analytical distinction from that of 
resources; consequently, conceptual overlaps and confusion are possible. "The fact 
that the line between resource and infrastructure cannot always be discerned should 
not cause undue concern, since the distinction is ultimately an analytical one" (p. 73). 
Some of the items they label infrastructure might be considered part of the regime, 
e.g., legislatures and police; others might be included among sectors, e.g., political 
parties; still others might be counted as resources, e.g., ideology. 
4 Leites and Wolf, for instance, have numerous suggestions about how authorities 
might more effectively counter insurgencies. 
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TABLE I5 
Ilchman/Uphoff Wriggins Leites /Wolf 
Rulers Regime Leader Authority 
Ruled Sectors Groups Population 
feudal land owners bureaucracy in rebellion 
middle peasantry military regular populace 
money lenders traditional 





civil servants, trade unions 
etc. media elite 
Anti-statesmen 
Resources Goods and Services None listed explic- People 
Status itly, though a Food 
Information variety are men- Material 
Force tioned in discuss- Information 
Legitimacy ing strategies, Efficiency 
Authority e.g., jobs, police, leadership 
skilled personnel, discipline 
social recogni-
tion, etc. 
Goals Stay in power: pres- Legitimacy Maintain and 
ent and future Independence harden authority 
Cope with and in- National unity Counter rebellions 
duce social and Social transfor - Strengthen pro-
economic change mation ductive capacity 





the question of short- versus long-term analyses, (3) the types of re-
sources, (4) the question of disaggregation, (5) internal and external 
exchanges, and ( 6) confusion between costs and ethics. 
Taking the viewpoint of those in authority has an inherent conserva-
tive bias since their sine qua non is preservation of their position of 
5 Categories of ruled are discussed in Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 40, and Wriggins, pp. 
60-88; resources are described in Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 58--91, and Leites and Wolf, 
pp. 32-42. 
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power. This need not be deplored, but it should be recognized. Any 
policy-oriented inquiry probably must begin with this assumption as a 
constraint in assessing alternatives. The result is that more "radical" 
social analyses and emphases on change are less likely to emerge, while 
law and order will usually be considered an important value. Leadership 
strategies tend to be regime-building rather than nation-building. Thus, 
in exchanges with the populace, a high priority is placed on conse-
quences for the regime rather than for the society. Although in many 
instances these may not conflict, some policies drawn up with the clear 
purpose of strengthening the coalition that most strongly supports the 
government may create social discontent by fostering a bourgeoisie 
that is loyal but is disliked by the populace, or by antagonizing groups 
outside the core coalition. (Menderes did this to the previously favored 
urban and modern sector of the population in Turkey when he adopted 
policies popular among peasants.) 
Wriggins is less self-conscious about, and less conscious of, this re-
gime bias than the others, perhaps because he has more explicitly as-
sumed the perspective of the political leader. The other authors deny 
that a bias exists in their analysis. Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their 
study is as relevant "to the choices made by revolutionaries as it is to 
those made by authorities" (p. 29), and Leites and Wolf maintain that 
they have tried to consider both the viewpoints of rebellion and of au-
thority. But both admit that their presentations may not be balanced. 
Leites and Wolf, for example, state "sometimes the posture of the au-
thority and, specifically, of U.S. policy in relation to authority, is adopted 
more completely than perfect balance would warrant" (p. vii). Any 
apparent preference for established authority is attributed to the ex-
igencies of presentation rather than inherent bias.6 Yet in spite of these 
explicit assertions, the tone and emphasis of the authors' analyses make 
it difficult to accept their statement. Ilchman and Uphoff label a group 
seeking to gain authority as "the anti-statesmen"-not a particularly 
neutral term. Furthermore, they make no distinction between those in 
authority roles and the role structure itself. Thus the anti-statesman, 
whether competing in an election or a revolution, is a pure antagonist 
of authority (p. 186), and possibilities for a change of personnel are 
presented in a harsh and overdrawn fashion. Lyndon Johnson, among 
others, has been accused of equating attacks upon himself with attacks 
upon the Presidency; surely this confusion should not be encouraged 
in a sophisticated framework for analysis. That it is, is due to Ilchman's 
8 Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their "restricted focus on the statesman's choices 
has been a matter of exposition rather than a matter of ethics" (p. 282). 
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and Uphoff's simplifying assumption that all authority belongs to the 
regime, their treatment of a regime as monolithic rather than as com-
posed of factions or disaggregate entities such as a legislature or con-
tentious groups within a cabinet, and their equation of regime structure 
with individual role occupants ( an equation that Wriggins also usu-
ally makes). 
Similar! y, Leites and Wolf focus on the rebellious tactics of violence 
and coercion rather than on the strategies of Gandhi, Lenin, or Ny-
erere who effectively used a withdrawal of legitimacy. When a change 
requires structural alterations first, those in authority frequently oppose 
it, although it may be desirable from some other perspectives. Moreover, 
their equation of campus rebellions with those in Vietnam and else-
where, and their emphasis on rebel tactics of lawlessness and terror make 
the reader feel that Leites and Wolf have little sympathy with rebels, 
in spite of their profession of equal empathy. Even where leaders are 
consciously attempting to bring about structural transformation, as in 
China and Tanzania, the goals of maintaining power and social re-
definition may conflict, although in such cases maintaining authority 
may be a requisite for serious change. 
The second major consideration that emerges from these analyses is 
the trade-off between long-term and short-term strategies. In spite of 
Keynes' well-known dictum about the long run, the arguments for 
pursuing short-term rather than long-term policies are not fully con-
vincing. As we begin to recognize that the effects of political and social 
policies may accumulate relatively unnoticed until they suddenly be-
come visible upon crossing a threshold, or that lags may occur in the 
effects of any policy so that short-term positive outcomes may eventu-
ally be outweighed by long-term losses, the need to consider both short-
and long-term effects becomes clear. 
Wriggins counsels against strategies that have rapidly diminishing 
returns after a short period; but Ilchman/Uphoff and Leites/Wolf ex-
plicitly favor short-term policies. The strategies a leader may pursue are 
frequently interchangeable and, as Wriggins argues, the shorter his 
time-perspective and the more focused his goal toward simply staying 
in power, the more indifferent he will probably be toward the strate-
gies he uses; any of them will help secure this short-term, albeit funda-
mental, goal. However, in the case of leaders who have long-run pur-
poses, strategies must be examined more critically, and the costs and 
benefits weighed more carefully, with respect to their consequences 
over a number of years. 
Ilchman and Uphoff take the opposite view, arguing that a short-
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term perspective is more realistic, less risky, and likely to yield quicker 
returns (pp. 260-272). Probably Leites and Wolf emphasize short-term 
strategies because of their focus on conflict situations where long-term 
considerations are frequently irrelevant. In situations where legitimacy 
is weak initially, such a short time perspective may be appropriate. But 
the manipulative tactics that are encouraged by such a perspective tend 
to depreciate in effectiveness. The popularity of leaders who enjoy the 
privileges of a former, foreign elite can dissipate quickly; those intimi-
dated by threats of coercion may find that their tolerance for violence 
increases over time, so that their compliance can be secured only by 
increasing demonstrations of repressive force. Thus, coercion and the 
appeal of a popular or charismatic personality tend to have short-run 
benefits, but they have dangerous potentials for the long run. On the 
other hand, building a party can bolster authority over longer periods 
-even through successive changes in the legitimizing ideology of the 
political system.7 
A third feature of the model which raises questions for analysis is the 
nature of resources. Some resources are said to be relatively constant, 
so that competition over their allocation resembles a zero-sum game. 
Status, power, and information all are considered to decline in value 
if they are widely shared (Wriggins, p. 29; Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 60-70, 
mo, 178). This interpretation emphasizes the distributive rather than 
the productive quality of resources and the resultant intense competi-
tion. Other resources, in contrast, such as goods or services, are seen 
as expandable rather than "relational." But is it empirically true that 
one can gain status or authority only at the expense of another? I think 
not. "Relational resources" may be increased by expanding the number 
of positions of status or authority, by enlarging their scope, or by in-
creasing their value (which frequently results when wider participa-
tion expands demand). Although the norms in various societies can 
more or less keep resources constant, only a narrow definition fostered 
by a zero-sum mentality requires certain resources to be merely "rela-
tional."8 
Another question concerning resources is what should be included 
as a resource. Wriggins, for instance, emphasizes the importance of in-
dividuals as a factor in developing strategies and managing resources. 
He states that "to generalize without close appraisal of the personal 
7 See Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in 
Modern Society (New York 1970), especially Moore's essay, 48-6o. 
8 For example, Jack Potter and others, eds., Peasant Society (Boston 1967), especially 
the essay by George Foster on the notion of the "Limited Good," which describes how 
economic goods are treated as a zero-sum resource in some societies, 300-323. 
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characteristics of specific leaders invites easy error" (p. 12). The value 
hierarchies of "statesmen" are considered important by Ilchman and 
Uphoff in determining "rational" strategies, and Leites and Wolf note 
the value that insurgencies derive from the frequent austerity of their 
leadership and from its ability to use calculated and discriminating 
violence, but neither recommend analyzing the differences that indi-
viduals can make upon strategies that are being pursued. From a macro-
perspective the impact of an individual personality may not be large 
enough to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. Nevertheless, it seems 
likely that in situations where precedents are lacking, not only the pref-
erences of a leader or set of leaders will be important in shaping policy, 
but also their individual skills. Ilchman and Uphoff write, "a statesman 
( or anti-statesman) does not win conflicts over authority and policy 
solely on the basis of his resource position. His skill at resource manage-
ment counts as well" (p. 16i). Personal skills of leaders, whether those 
of a Hitler-like propagandist or an intelligent social analyst, might also 
be counted as resources within the model. 
The number and complexity of disaggregations is the fourth problem 
in a model of executive strategy. Since reality is complex, a large num-
ber of distinctions can be made. But the more distinctions one includes 
in the model, the more difficult it is to measure and relate the resulting 
variables. Leites and Wolf make few distinctions, separating out as 
actors only a populace caught between the two extreme competitors of 
authority and rebellion. Although a number of sub-populations having 
different responses could be distinguished, these disaggregations are not 
necessary for their purposes. 
On the other hand, W rig gins, and especially Ilchman and Uphoff, 
propose a multitude of distinctions and variables. Since W riggins' 
presentation is less formal, aimed primarily at description, a good bit 
of underbrush must be cleared away before his work can be used with 
quantitative data. Ilchman and Uphoff's heavily theoretical presentation 
is complicated by their elaborate disaggregations. "Currencies" such as 
support and allegiance are distinguished from resources, sectors are 
overlapping and extensive in number, and similar processes are given 
different labels. For instance, mobilizing a sector-that is, increasing 
its awareness, importance, and influence-and building an infrastructure 
may be analyzed in identical terms. As a result, their verbal distinctions 
far exceed their capacity to measure or test. We are told that the absence 
of empirical data and measures is due largely to their desire to publish 
a manageable theoretical book (see pp. 74, 273), and that empirical 
work that would operationalize their model, and measure its variables, 
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is under way and will soon be forthcoming. However, until such opera-
tionalized tests of their model prove me wrong, I suspect that many 
of their variables may be too disaggregated, too complex, and too am-
biguous to be measured. As a result, we have more a verbal paradigm 
than a model. If Ilchman and Uphoff had attempted to build a formal 
model, as is done, for instance, in computer simulations, I am sure their 
complex distinctions would have been abandoned in favor of fewer, 
more critical disaggregations. In such a model it is important to keep 
disaggregations at a minimum, choosing a strategy that maximizes the 
explanatory capacity of a manageable number of variables. It is possible 
to represent a number of complex relationships and to evaluate the im-
plications of various policies in a fairly simple twelve-equation model 
of politics and economics, as the work of Brunner and Brewer has 
shown.9 In constructing a model, critical simplifications help organize 
complexity more usefully than adding refinements and disaggregations. 
Perhaps the general framework and the complex verbal components of 
The Political Economy of Change can serve best to clarify choices in 
building models, especially those that explore a single policy area or 
set of exchanges. 
The relation between internal and external transactions is the fifth 
important point raised in these volumes. Leites and Wolf stress the im-
portant role that "exogenous" inputs such as foreign support and sup-
plies play in a rebellion. W riggins cites foreign policy as one major 
strategy tool for leaders. However, he warns of the disadvantages of 
foreign inputs. "Resources from abroad ... may subject the regime to 
accusations of failing to protect national integrity and independence" 
(p. 257). Ilchman and Uphoff include "external governments" as "sec-
tors" and agree with W riggins that these may donate resources, in-
cluding legitimacy, to a regime (p. 47; Wriggins p. 228). 
Although they recognize the importance of foreign inputs, all three 
books ignore serious and, among third-world states, highly salient ques-
tions of foreign transfers, namely imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
In a number of third-world states, conservative oligarchies are assisted 
in retaining power by external transactions with both governmental 
and non-governmental agencies, while foreign corporations maintain 
control over large areas of economic decision-making. Such control 
can be pervasive and difficult to avoid.10 
9 See Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, Organized Complexity: Empirical 
Theories of Political Development (New York r97r). 
10 Even in a "radical" state such as Tanzania, the price and sales of one of its im-
portant export items, pyrethrum, are determined by one firm in London. The Tan-
ganyika Extract Company (TECO) limits output, yet controls all purchases. In 1968, 
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A model focusing on political leadership could clarify and pinpoint 
many of the fuzzy areas in theories about imperialism in its many 
forms, and provide a useful framework for gathering data to test these 
theories. However, a study that documented the exchanges between a 
regime and foreign agencies, no matter how valuable a guide to policy 
it might be, would be encouraged by few governments. Since data for 
such a study would be difficult to amass without the encouragement and 
cooperation of policy-makers, such an inquiry is unlikely. 
This observation relates to the last question concerning the analyti-
cal model that the authors have in common, namely the role of ethics 
and choice in policy analysis. Some policy inquiries may require a cost-
ing of strategies that would result in serious deprivations for some 
groups currently rewarded by authority. Most "statesmen" are not 
receptive to policy inquiries that run counter to their own predisposi-
tions or involve severe deprivations for a group within their coalition. 
What role can a social scientist play in a regime whose goals and values 
foreclose consideration of certain relevant policy alternatives, or whose 
values would be deplored by most social scientists? 
This question of ethics in policy choices is the final problem to which 
Ilchman and Uphoff address themselves. If we assume that alternatives 
should be weighed on a cost/benefit basis, how are alternative strategies 
to be evaluated? For what benefits is one willing to use massive violence 
to pursue a successful rebellion, or a counter-insurgency operation? To 
what end could Leites and Wolf justify building the intelligence sys-
tems they describe, which resemble those used by South Africa and Nazi 
Germany, to monitor and crush opposition? Whose values does one use 
in determining the "cost" of various alternatives? 
Aside from the underlying goal of maintaining authority, two of the 
books ignore the relationship between strategy and substantive goals. 
Wriggins fails to relate his eight strategies or tactics to his list of goals. 
Leites and Wolf simply exclude goals other than survival, except to 
note the extra burden such responsibilities can impose on authorities. 
Ilchman and Uphoff, on the other hand, tackle the problem theoreti-
cally, claiming that with their model "it should be possible to impute 
the costs and consequences of policy choices, after which ethical and 
intelligent judgments could then be made" (pp. 282-83, italics added). 
An intelligent analysis of consequences, they argue, improves ethical 
considerations by clarifying costs and benefits of choices. Such a posi-
as a result, the local market value of pyrethrum flowers declined by 45 per cent. I am 
indebted to Idrian Resnick, economist in the Tanzanian Ministry of Development 
Planning, for pointing this out. 
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tion ignores the fact that the operation of calculating costs and benefits 
involves basic normative or ethical considerations. One cannot post-
pone these until after cost has been determined, since normative assump-
tions are made in constructing measures for pricing and predicting 
consequences of policies. Realizing this, we could begin to add some of 
the classical political values-such as equality, freedom, and justice, 
which are notably absent from the analysis in all three volumes-to the 
measures of exchange in the model.11 
II. LEGITIMACY, SUPPORT, AND AUTHORITY 
Perhaps the central element underlying the permanent establishment 
of authority is legitimacy. Political legitimacy refers to the degree to 
which the exercise of political authority, by individuals through a set 
of institutions, is regarded as right or appropriate.12 What clearly dis-
tinguishes authority from coercion and force on the one hand, and 
"leadership" on the other, is legitimacy.13 
All three volumes recognize the importance of legitimacy, although 
only Ilchman and Uphoff explicitly discuss it at length. According to 
Wriggins, legitimacy is the first goal sought by new leaders who, "hav-
ing legitimacy ... are assured of their authority" (p. 39). A principal 
concern of Leites' and Wolf's study is "how to maintain and strength-
en" authority, which they define as the "legal and legitimized right and 
capacity to command" (p. 4). 
In rapidly changing societies, especially ones with new regimes, 
legitimacy is frequently weak or eroded. On this point all three books 
agree. As a result, authority tends to be vulnerable. On the other hand, 
a large portion of the population is usually politically distant from the 
central regime, and, compared to states which have completed social 
mobilization,1"' fewer exchanges occur between center and periphery. 
For a regime's "legitimacy must be acknowledged not just by citizens, 
but, more importantly, also by those who control other valued re-
11 These concerns need not be excluded from the rigorous analysis imposed by the 
discipline of "political economy." See, for instance, the article by Thomas Gale Moore, 
"An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom," fournal of Political Economy, 
Lxxvu (July/August 1969), 532-42. Curiously, articles from this journal are nowhere 
cited by Ilchman and Uphoff. 
12 For a discussion of legitimacy, see Dolf Sternberger, "Legitimacy" in David Sills, 
ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IX (New York 1968), 244-48; 
and David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York 1965), 348-72. 
18 Robert L. Peabody, "Authority," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
I (fn. 12), 473-76. 
14 This term is used by Karl Deutsch to describe the effects of literacy, urbanization, 
industrialization, and other aspects of modernity upon society. See K. W. Deutsch, 
"Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 
LV (September 1961), 493-514. 
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sources."15 Thus, the legitimation of authority is critical in the mobi-
lized sector of a society, while the residual or more traditional sector 
remains apart and largely passive, accepting the "modern" government 
for whatever traditional symbols it retains and simply because it is 
there.16 
Legitimacy is an attribute ascribed by individuals and groups to the 
governing process in which they live.11 Moreover, it is a continuous 
rather than a dichotomous variable, fluctuating over time. It is com-
posed of hundreds of evaluations made by individuals and groups re-
garding the actions of the authority structure, both past and future. 
Principles held by individuals concerning the policies, personnel, and 
procedures that are right or appropriate for a regime may be based on 
a mixture of influences, such as religion or precedent, that are seldom 
explicit, consistent, or easily articulated. Such principles can check a 
regime's prerogatives and limit the alternatives it can pursue since, if 
a regime wishes to retain legitimacy, its policies and procedures must 
be largely in accord with the normative expectations of the populace. 
To be sure, legitimacy is difficult to measure. Ilchman and Uphoff 
suggest it might be measured as the amount of compliance and sup-
port that a regime enjoys after the effects of coercion and other induce-
ments have been accounted for. Similarly, Fred Riggs notes that "we 
find people-citizens, bureaucrats, and others-who show a willingness 
to follow instructions . . . [ when neither immediate reward, coercion, 
expertise, or solidarity] motives are present. This willingness involves 
legitimacy.ms Operational tests to calibrate this residual willingness to 
comply would require enormous skill and imagination, since legitimacy 
and compliance may be only weakly related, especially when the sanc-
tions commanded by a regime to enforce its rule are numerous and 
effective. Moreover, a focus on compliance behavior as a manifest con-
sequence of legitimacy directs our attention away from the phenomenon 
of legitimacy itself, and muddles the concept. Essentially, the political 
legitimacy of a regime is found and best measured in the attitudes of 
a population toward its regime. Compliance behavior and attitudes of 
support should be treated as distinct, although interdependent, vari-
ables.19 
15 Peabody (fn. 13). 
16 See Fred Riggs, "Administration and a Changing World Environment," Public 
Administration Review, xxvm (July 1968) on this point. 
17 This is similar to the categorization used by Richard M. Merelman, "Learning 
and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LX (September 1966), 548-61. 
18 Riggs (fn. 16). 
10 In the last decade dozens of articles and books have repeatedly referred to le-
gitimacy. In most cases, however, no careful analysis for clarifying the concept was 
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Legitimacy is a nettlesome concept, and it is easy to disagree over 
how it relates to other aspects of the political process. Nevertheless, two 
propositions about legitimacy that are advanced by Ilchman and Up-
hoff seem erroneous and should not be allowed to pass. First, the authors 
assert that "it is possible, at least in theory, that occupants of authority 
roles could have no legitimacy whatsoever. With enough other re-
sources, compliance with public policies might still be secured" (p. 81). 
But with no legitimacy, it would seem to be an error in semantics to 
say that a regime had authority. Authority is legitimized power ac-
cording to many standard definitions (including that of Leites and 
Wolf), and occupants of authority roles in a regime ( or in a business, 
trade union, or church, for that matter) would have to have at least 
some legitimacy.20 
The second assertion by Ilchman and Uphoff that seems questionable 
is that support freely given may "be freely withdrawn," while support 
that is coerced or bought may be more stable (p. 79). This is reminiscent 
of Machiavelli's dictum that between fear and love as the basis for a 
prince's rule, fear is the more reliable. However, support that is based 
on legitimacy is freely given and is more stable than coerced or bought 
support, which is likely to disappear wherever the regime is short on 
inducements. Such support, engendered by legitimacy, is less readily 
affected, since legitimacy is based on slowly changing norms and ac-
cumulated evaluations. 
Similarly, Leites and Wolf argue that supply (resources) is more im-
portant than demand (popularity) in establishing authority. "The 
progress made by each side in the conflict influences the affiliations of 
most of the population as much as or more than it is influenced by those 
affiliations" (p. 151). But substitution of other resources for legitimacy 
can lead to a dangerous deflationary spiral that prompts insurrection. 
As Eric Nordlinger suggests, "once governments rely upon force, they 
tend to overreact to demands with the application of excessive force; 
the value of organizations with force at their disposal ( the army and 
the police) is heightened; there is consequently a further loss of legiti-
presented, and an empirical investigation of the phenomenon was rarer still. For in-
stance, a most extensive research effort by David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children 
in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York 1969) focused only 
on the acquisition of attitudes of "diffuse support" (Easton's definition of legitimacy) 
by children, and used few if any questions which relate directly to "the general idea 
of legitimacy," namely, the ethical acceptability of government ( see p. 414). 
20 When legitimacy is quite low, authority becomes naked power, whereas when 
other resources vanish, authority is merely formal, not effective. Harold D. Lasswell 
and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven 1950), 135-41. 
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macy; and finally the population itself turns to violence .... "21 While 
some regimes with low legitimacy may retain authority by using a great 
deal of coercion, few (perhaps Haiti) have survived over a long period 
without using other strategies. On the other hand, regimes with high 
legitimacy can generate support freely given, without a quid pro quo 
(see Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 74). 
The position of legitimacy within the exchanges between a regime 
and the populace is outlined in Figure r. The downward arrows indi-
cate the regime's outputs that serve as objects for response and evalua-
tion, and the upward arrows illustrate "flows" of legitimacy, compli-
ance, and support. Legitimacy may be accorded to the personnel, poli-
cies, or procedures of a regime. While a particular government action 





FIGURE I. LEGITIMACY PROCESS: MACRO LEVEL 
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21 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of 
Change," World Politics, xx (April 1968), 508. 
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population would feel that it was wrong, it might be accepted as legiti-
mate, provided most other actions were seen as rightful. An overflow 
from these other legitimate acts could legitimize the action, possibly 
altering norms. If the government is generally trusted to do what is 
right, a few questionable actions may not affect overall legitimacy.22 
Figure I illustrates how the populace evaluates the effects of a re-
gime's activity: through the appeal of its personnel, the costs and bene-
fits of its policies, and the justice of its procedures. It may calculate 
"rationally" that it is to its advantage to comply with and support the 
regime, entering into what Ilchman and Uphoff refer to as "mutually 
beneficial exchanges." The effect upon support would be fairly immedi-
ate. But this calculation is essentially separate from the legitimation 
process, and is shown only because legitimacy affects similar variables, 
namely compliance and support. The legitimacy exchange illustrated 
involves a greater lag in response, as the government's actions affect 
the level of legitimacy. 
Changes in principles or ideas about what is rightful for government 
are shown (hypothesized) to be based on the interaction of two vari-
ables. One is the degree of satisfaction with the policies of a regime; 
the other, a conglomerate and exogenous factor, is one's store of values 
based on experience in daily social, economic, and cultural activities. 
Social mobilization tends to alter this latter variable, creating new 
values and ideas about political participation and rights and the range 
of personal needs for which government is responsible. Changes in 
these two variables ( and expanded demands on government may re-
duce policy satisfaction, although policies are unchanged) affect the 
evaluation process by eroding old ideas of what are just procedures 
on the part of leaders, and reinforcing those that conform to current 
values. The impact of mobilization and modernization upon values 
has altered the normative structure of societies, slowly eroding transcen-
dental justifications of authority. Nevertheless, because legitimacy gen-
erally changes rather slowly, it can dampen the effects that fluctuations 
in performance may have upon support. 
Four strategies for increasing legitimacy, and consequently support, 
are mentioned in the books under discussion: pursuit of satisfactory 
policies, possession of effective power, responsive action, and the shaping 
of normative structure. Ilchman and Uphoff state, "to acquire and 
22 See William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill. 1968), 45-54, 
whose concept of "generalized trust" parallels that of Easton's idea of "diffuse sup-
port" and may be related to legitimacy. A government is more likely to be seen as 
legitimate when one trusts that it will do what it should do, and there is a high 
probability of preferred outcomes being achieved. 
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maintain legitimacy the statesman or anti-statesman must confer bene-
fits ••.. Sectors will not grant legitimacy to the regime unless the re-
gime in turn in some way enhances their well-being" (p. 74). The 
provision of desired benefits is similar to the strategy for building legiti-
macy suggested by Seymour Lipset. He states, "prolonged effectiveness 
over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system. 
In the modern world, such effectiveness means primarily constant eco-
nomic development."23 Another form of effectiveness considered more 
by Hobbes than by Lipset is the ability to maintain compliance through 
the judicious application of force. Force, rather than positive incentives, 
is usually considered an inefficient way to maintain a regime and hence 
is generally associated with regimes that lack legitimacy. However, the 
ability to deal out negative reinforcements to individuals who fail to 
comply with the regulations of the regime may also be an important 
source of effectiveness. 
The second strategy by which a regime may gain legitimacy is by 
having the support of powerful sectors of society. This strategy is ap-
parently the one Wriggins would recommend. Although he lists legiti-
macy as the first goal of leaders, he ignores legitimacy in his conclud-
ing section which relates strategy to goals. However, he does conclude 
that without building an "aggregation of power," "governance is im-
possible" (p. 263); Wriggins only briefly elaborates on this central con-
cept, suggesting that aggregation entails acquiring the support of "in-
dividuals and groups who have power over still others" (p. 8). Since 
all of his eight strategies are supposed to help in aggregating power, 
their success presumably should aid in creating legitimacy. 
Arthur Stinchcombe has suggested that "a power is legitimate to the 
degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, 
the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as 
reserves in case of need, to make his power effective."24 From this Rich-
ard Flacks concludes that we may "predict that individuals will tend 
to perceive the action of an authority as legitimate if that action has 
or is likely to have the support of other centers."25 An individual also 
might accept a regime as legitimate on principle even when he did 
not like or trust it, if he felt most others accepted it as legitimate. Evi-
dence of failure of officials in the regime or in other key institutions 
to support national authority would be a clear sign of eroding legiti-
23 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y. 1960), 70. 
H Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York 1968), 162, cited 
in Richard Flacks, "Protest or Conform: Some Social Psychological Perspectives on 
Legitimacy," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, v, No. 2 (196g), 134. 
25 Richard Flacks, ibid. 
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macy. Conversely, if the populace perceived that key sectors accord 
legitimacy to a regime and make themselves available to help imple-
ment its policies, their "demonstration effect" should maintain legiti-
macy even when public opinion shifts against current office holders. 
A third strategy for increasing legitimacy is responsiveness to expecta-
tions of right and justice. In more traditional society, rules grounded 
in religious doctrine could check a ruler's power and insure that his 
conformity to procedures and policies was responsive to the fairly lim-
ited and static needs and expectations of the populace. In modern so-
ciety, various legitimizing principles have evolved to replace traditional 
ones. These doctrines usually aim at insuring responsiveness of regimes 
and avoiding tyranny. They nearly always include some notion of popu-
lar sovereignty and, frequently, means of protecting minorities.26 Dele-
gation of authority, limitation of power, and access to and participation 
in the decision-making process are perhaps the basic ways to insure a 
regime's responsiveness (Ilchman and Uphoff, on pp. 201-02, mention 
delegation of authority). This access, participation, and incorporation 
of individuals or groups in the regime may insure the desired respon-
siveness to their needs and values. Elections, legislatures, and local gov-
ernment are common devices to increase responsiveness. Since these 
devices tend to check "arbitrary" (illegitimate) power, a regime can 
promote its legitimacy by adhering to them. Greater access for indi-
viduals and groups to the decision-making process, through these popu-
lar mechanisms, is likely to increase negative (corrective) feedback in 
the system. Those with a cybernetic view of politics might argue that 
structures for participation help solve communications and control 
problems; thus, the political doctrines and myths of representation have 
been imbued with sanctity because of their efficacy. 
Responsiveness may often take the form of symbolic output: a regime 
that is ineffective in providing improved living standards or in ac-
cumulating force to insure the compliance of subjects may nevertheless 
legitimize itself through words rather than deeds. Such a regime, by 
symbolic outputs responsive to the sentiments, expectations, and identi-
ties of the population, may elevate national self-images and secure sup-
port and legitimacy from the population even though, for example, 
living standards may be falling. 
The fourth strategy for increasing legitimacy aims at shaping a so-
ciety' s normative structure through manipulation of political doctrines 
and formulae. Since the ideology of a populace, in the broad sense of the 
26 The Federalist Papers are a classic illustration of the history of the formulation 
of such doctrines. 
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term used by Robert Lane, 21 contains the norms that determine what is 
considered legitimate, strategies to alter the ideological beliefs of a 
populace are needed in order to change the range of the legitimate use 
of power by authorities. Such strategies might involve using various 
agencies, such as the educational system, the press, or a political party to 
communicate new ideology which justifies changes in the "political for-
mula" or myths that define accepted practices for a regime. 28 The intro-
duction of new ideological components, either sui generis or by adop-
tion from abroad, is a strategy frequently used in developing states to 
change the content of legitimacy norms (see Wriggins, pp. 129-44 and 
Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 239-41). Such forms of "legitimacy investments" 
involve manipulating the normative structure (Ilchman and Uphoff, 
p. 201). For instance, Donald Rothchild suggests that in Kenya the 
regime might "move to the left" in order to increase its legitimacy 
through the popularity which leftist egalitarian doctrines could gen-
erate.29 
If the anticipated consequences on legitimacy were included when 
alternative strategies are weighed, better, more realistic policy assess-
ments would result. The effects of legitimacy are quite tangible, but 
they often are long-term and overlooked. The Vietnam war, for in-
stance, may have affected legitimacy within the United States, perhaps 
with consequences for several decades, owing to its special impact on 
people at impressionable ages-much as the depression of the 193o's 
had lasting effects on an earlier generation. Greater attention to legiti-
mation processes could bring such consequences more clearly into focus. 
By assessing a regime's level of legitimacy, priorities among policy 
alternatives can be more easily determined. If a regime is in dangerous-
ly short supply of legitimacy, it may wish to concentrate on actions to 
bolster its position; if it has a large stock, it may wish to expend some 
of it on policies that will be unpopular in the short run but are likely 
to yield high long-run dividends. Where legitimacy is low, manipula-
tion of support is higher and the conditions for challenging a regime's 
authority are improved. Wolf suggests that the probability of insurgency 
seems to increase with economic development "over a considerable 
range" (p. 51). This apparent relationship may result through the ef-
fects of legitimacy as an intervening variable. Since economic change 
tends to create frustrations and weaken normative order, it is likely 
27 See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York 1960). 
28 See Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 20), 126-34. 
29 This might also be a responsiveness strategy. See Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's 
Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," American Political 
Science Review, LXIV (September 1970), 753. 
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to reduce legitimacy. If so, its effect upon legitimacy may be one of the 
reasons why economic change appears to create political unrest and 
increase the chances of insurgency. 
III. PoucY STUDIES oF THE FuTuRE 
The merits and faults of these works suggest several recommenda-
tions for future policy-oriented empirical studies. First, the more ana-
lytical frameworks are relevant for the study of any political system, 
from the university to the modern nation state, the more useful they 
are likely to be. Wriggins' framework, especially, lacks the benefit of 
such universal applicability. As his purpose was to discuss politics in 
the African-Asian context, this may be an unfair criticism. However, a 
study of executive leadership in these environments need not be divorced 
from a study of executive leadership in general. A study of authority 
maintenance in "more developed" states should be as valuable an exer-
cise as such a study in a "less developed" one, and the categories of 
analysis should be similar. Ilchman's and Upho.ff's analysis, for instance, 
could have drawn more heavily on examples from developed states, 
particularly the United States, for which more data may exist that are 
relevant to the variables they wish to measure. Economists have, after 
all, had much more success in building models and predicting effects of 
policies in the more developed economies. 
Second, studies that apply the model of executive strategy might use-
fully focus on the important areas that executives control. Instances of 
imperialism (neo-colonialism) and corruption in third-world states 
should be susceptible to analysis since these practices, however defined, 
include, or rest upon, the actions of leaders themselves. Among indus-
trialized states, studies of political leadership and "political investment" 
strategies should be especially valuable since the resources controlled 
by leaders in these states are so great. In such studies, we can more 
readily move from a focus on political development that conceals our 
political preferences and confines the concepts we use, to a focus on 
political change. 30 
A third feature of future policy studies should be an emphasis upon 
measuring the processes of change. Within the general approach sug-
gested by these books, measures of system performance are needed in 
addition to the more specific measures discussed, such as percentage 
30 Samuel P. Huntington makes a strong argument for shifting our attention from 
viewing the political process in terms of "development" to examining politics in terms 
of "change" in his essay, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and 
Politics," Comparative Politics, m (April 1971), 283-322. 
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of voter turnout. For instance, could we calculate, over time, the total 
effects of a regime's policies on net national power (perhaps the aver-
age value of resources that maintain authority)? Such measurements 
could be one of the most critical new areas for imaginative research 
and inquiry in the social sciences. Focusing on the macro-effects of an 
executive strategy would require a technique for calculating equiva-
lences between different kinds of resources. Ilchman and Uphoff de-
scribe such conversion rates between resources, but are unable to sug-
gest how they might be calculated. However, if such measures were 
designed, we might be able to examine the gross and net effects of a 
particular policy on national resources. 
We need empirical applications devoid of unnecessary concepts and 
theorizing. Ilchman and Uphoff state that "the more encompassing an 
explanation is, the less testable, the less varifiable, and the less certain 
it is as a causal explanation, and thus the weaker it is as a basis for pre-
diction and choice" (p. 261). Unfortunately, the analytical frameworks 
discussed tend to be so encompassing that manageable research using 
selected variables from them will be difficult. Albert Hirschman has 
argued that there are hindrances to understanding that accompany a 
premature paradigm and high level of generalization. If paradigms or 
even extended economic analogies are used without caution, they may 
inhibit the flow of insights and understanding of specific contextual 
events, and result in mindless theorizing.31 
Finally, ethical considerations can and should play an important role 
in the policy sciences. Otherwise, the view from the top tends to be a 
bloodless one, dominated by cold calculations of costs and benefits in 
a market place of competing interest groups, classes, or sectors, with 
one authority acting more in order to preserve itself than to deliver 
political goods such as liberty, security, welfare, or justice.32 One can 
accept the need for and value of policy research without agreeing with 
Ilchman' s and Uphoff' s efficiency criteria of political man. They believe 
that wise statesmen are "political," maximizing efficiency in pursuing 
"collective ends" (p. 282); but the economy of a leader's choice is not 
independent of the ends pursued. Both those whose ends are "collected" 
and the content of these ends can affect the efficiency criterion. 
Economists, for good or ill, have become regular advisors on domestic 
31 Some of the diagrams in Leites and Wolf and the distinctions made by Ilchman 
and Uphoff occasionally leave this impression. For the critique of "mindless theorizing" 
see Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understand-
ing," World Politics, XXII (April 1970), 329-43. 
32 See J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political 
Goods," World Politics, xvm (April 1966), 415-34. 
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policy, while political scientists are seldom consulted.as There is a defi-
nite position that could be filled by policy scientists devoted to questions 
of political strategy, if political scientists can develop the capacities to 
play such a role.a¾ As economically developed societies seem to give 
greater attention to questions of value, ethical concerns will increasingly 
be considered an important part of policy analysis. Future "political 
economists" need not abandon the humanist's concern or relegate it to 
the last stage of analysis in developing the quantitative rigor and the 
focus on policy choice that a model of executive strategy will require. 
33 In the United States, for instance, there is no functional equivalent to the National 
Council of Economic Advisors for political policy, at least not one staffed by profes-
sional political scientists. Those who serve as advisors in the U.S. or abroad are nearly 
always specialists in comparative politics and political development who are asked to 
advise on policies of foreign and military strategy, or specialists in public administra-
tion and law who are consulted on problems in bureaucratic and agency performance. 
One reason for this situation is that until recently there has been little scholarship de-
voted to planning and policy among professional political scientists. 
S¾ James (Samuel) Coleman, at an International Political Science Roundtable on 
Quantitative Methods, in Mannheim, Germany, July 5-ro, r97r, suggested that the im-
pending important dispute in political science was likely to be between "political 
economists"-that is, a group who seek greater rigor in theoretical models and quanti-
tative techniques-and those "behavioralists" who are satisfied with established data 
analysis and descriptive statistical approaches. 
